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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
EVIDENCE-REs IPSA LOQUITUR IN ACCIDENTS INVOLVING SIDDING
AND SWERVING VEHICLES
Plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile northbound on a state highway.
It was raining or snowing and there was slush on the highway causing slippery
conditions. Defendant's truck, headed south, crossed into the northbound lane
and struck the car in which plaintiff was riding, injuring plaintiff. At the trial,
defendant gave no explanation for the accident and offered no proof on the
issue of negligence. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The Appellate
Division, by a divided court, reversed the judgment on the law and dismissed
the complaint. The court found that there was no evidence as to the cause of
the skid. The Court of Appeals reinstated the judgment for the plaintiff. Held,
when a vehicle crosses onto the wrong side of the road and damage results, a
case of negligence is made out prima facie sufficient to go to the jury for a
determination of liability. Pfaffenbach v. White Plains Express Corp., 17 N.Y.2d
132, 216 N.E.2d 324, 269 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1966).
In a negligence action, the plaintiff has the burden of showing defendant's
failure to exercise due care, resulting in the breach of some duty owing to the
plaintiff, and that burden of persuasion can never be shifted to the defendant.'
Where possible, the plaintiff discharges this burden by introducing direct evi-
dence tending to prove the facts alleged. However, when direct evidence is not
available, the plaintiff may carry his burden by proffering circumstantial evi-
dence, providing that such circumstances, "unexplained, justify an inference
of negligence."'2 It is as circumstantial evidence that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur may be invoked by a plaintiff. 3 To rely upon the doctrine, plaintiff's
evidence must show that the instrument causing the injury was under the
control and management of the one charged with negligence4 and that the acci-
dent is one which would not ordinarily have occurred without neglect by the
defendant of some duty owing to the plaintiff.Y Having satisfied these require-
ments, plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of negligence. In other words,
the procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur in New York is to raise an inference
of negligence which the trier of fact may accept or reject. 6 In exceptional cir-
1. Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230, at 233, 196 N.E. 36, at 37 (1935).
2. Id. at 233, 196 N.E. at 38.
3. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 183 (1949); Seavey, Res
Ipsa Loquitur; Tabula in Naufragio, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 643 (1950). But see Jaffee, Res Ipsa
Loquitur Vindicated, 1 Buffalo L. Rev. 1 (1951).
4. George Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E.2d 455 (1941); Slater
v. Barnes, 241 N.Y. 284, 149 N.E. 859 (1925); see Prosser, Torts § 39, at 222-25 (3d ed.
1964); 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2509, at 381 (3d ed. 1940).
5. E.g., George Folds, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E.2d 455 (1941);
Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230, 196 N.E. 36 (1935); see Prosser, op. cit. supra note 4,
§ 39, at 218-22; 9 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 4, § 2509.
6. George Folds, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E.2d 455 (1941); see
Prosser, op. cit. supra note 4, § 40; 2 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 285, 290(5). In a
minority of jurisdictions, res ipsa loquitur raises a presumption of negligence rather than a
mere inference. The presumption shifts the burden of producing evidence to the defendant
and, where defendant fails to come forward with rebutting evidence, the jury is bound to
return a verdict in favor of plaintiff. See Prosser, op. cit. supra at 234, n.38.
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cumstances, the inference may be so compelling that the conclusion of negligence
is inescapable if not rebutted by other evidence. 7 In such a situation, plaintiff
may be entitled to summary judgment or a directed verdict. 8 Generally however,
a res ipsa loquitur case, if not rebutted, will merely allow plaintiff to reach
the jury.0
In automobile negligence actions, the applicability of res ipsa loquitur has
come to depend upon the particular fact situation involved and the legal rela-
tionship between plaintiff and defendant. The New York courts have been vexed
by the problem of applying res ipsa loquitur where a vehicle leaves the road or
its own lane of traffic and where such an occurrence involves either a sudden
swerve or a skid of the vehicle. American jurisdictions have differed in their
approach to these problems. Upon a showing that a vehicle leaves the road
or crosses over into the opposite lane of traffic by virtue of a sudden swerve,
a plaintiff, whether a guest passenger or not, is generally allowed to rely upon
res ipsa loquitur in making out a prima facie case.1 However, where such an
occurrence is caused by the skid of the vehicle, the courts have generally refused
to allow a plaintiff, whether a guest passenger or not, to invoke res ipsa loquitur
without showing something more."
The early New York cases seemed to indicate that New York would follow
the majority of states and allow a plaintiff to rely upon res ipsa loquitur where
he could show that defendant's vehicle suddenly swerved off the roadway and
the injured plaintiff was either a guest passenger in the vehicle 2 or a pedes-
trian.13 In 1935 however, the Court of Appeals decided Galbraith v. Busch'4
which laid the groundwork for thirty years of confusion in this segment of
New York tort law. The plaintiff was a passenger in defendant's automobile,
which was proceeding down a good highway in clear weather and at a moderate
speed. Suddenly and for no apparent reason, defendant's vehicle left the road-
way and crashed into a tree, injuring the plaintiff. The Court ruled that upon a
showing of this and nothing more, plaintiff could not rely upon res ipsa loquitur
and his complaint was dismissed.15 The Court reasoned that, even assuming that
the circumstances justified "an inference that the automobile was not carefully
operated or was not carefully maintained,""' the plaintiff was a guest passenger
to whom the defendant owed no duty to discover and repair defects in the car.
Consequently, the accident could just as possibly have been the result of a non-
7. E.g., Baroff v. Becker, 197 F. Supp. 9 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); O'Brien v. Purpura, 25
Misc. 2d 1009, 205 N.Y.S.2d 3 (Sup. Ct. 1960); see George Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York,
287 N.Y. 108, 121, 38 N.E.2d 455, 462 (1941) (dictum) ; Prosser, op. cit. supra note 4, § 40;
cf. Schwartzberg v. Norotsky, 20 Misc. 2d 638, 194 N.Y.S.2d 26 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
8. See Prosser, op. cit. supra note 4, § 40.
9. Ibid.
10. See Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 6, § 28 (1961).
11. See Annot, 58 A.L.R. 264 (1929), supplemented in 113 A.L.R. 1002 (1938).
12. Bennett v. Edward, 239 App. Div. 157, 267 N.Y. Supp. 417 (lst Dep't 1933).
13. Locicero v. Messina, 239 App. Div. 635, 267 N.Y. Supp. 901 (1st Dep't 1933).
14. 267 N.Y. 230, 196 N.E. 36 (1935).
15. Ibid.
16. Id. at 235, 196 N.E. at 38.
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negligent mechanical defect as the result of negligent operation. 17 Two years later
the Court of Appeals decided Lahr v. Tirrel.'8 While the facts were similar to
Galbraith, this accident occurred on a slippery road covered with ice and slush.
The car skidded off the road and overturned. The Court again ruled that a
plaintiff guest passenger could not rely upon res ipsa loquitur to take his case
to the jury. The Court reiterated the rule of Galbraith and, concurring with the
apparent weight of authority,19 ruled that an inference of negligence could not
arise from a mere showing of a skid of a vehicle upon a slippery surface.2 0 In
subsequent cases, the Court of Appeals has strictly adherred to the doctrines set
forth in these two leading cases.
21
The lower New York courts have restricted Galbraith to its facts and have
allowed res ipsa loquitur to be invoked where defendant's vehicle suddenly
swerved from its lane into a vehicle in the oncoming lane of traffic and plaintiff
was an occupant of the other vehicle.2 2 A pedestrian, off the roadway, has also
been allowed to rely upon res ipsa loquitur where he has shown that defendant's
vehicle left the roadway and struck him. 23 And likewise, upon facts similar to
Galbraith, a non-guest passenger has been successful in invoking res ipsa
loquitur.24 These cases have rejected Galbraith by reasoning that the plaintiffs
involved did not assume the risk for mechanical defects in the vehicles which
caused them injury; therefore the accident was one which would not have
ordinarily occurred without the negligence of the defendant, either in the
operation or maintenance of his vehicle. The lower courts have further re-
stricted Galbraith by allowing a guest passenger to reach the jury where there
is some sufficient additional ingredient from which the negligence of the driver
may be inferred.25
In those situations which involve a vehicle skidding off or across the road,
17. Id. at 235, 196 N.E. at 39.
18. 274 N.Y. 112, 8 N.E.2d 298 (1937).
19. See supra note 11.
20. Lahr v. Tirrel, 274 N.Y. 112, 117, 8 N.E.2d 298, 300 (1937).
21. E.g., Gooch v. Shapiro, 8 N.Y.2d 1088, 170 N.E.2d 830, 208 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1960),
affirming 7 A.D.2d 307, 182 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1st Dep't 1959); Cole v. Swagler, 308 N.Y. 325,
125 N.E.2d 592 (1955); Marinan v. Ironberger, 280 N.Y. 640, 20 N.E.2d 1011 (1939)
(alternative ground).
22. Cameron v. Dooley, 18 A.D.2d 130, 238 N.Y.S.2d 338 (3d Dep't 1963) ; cf. Anderson
v. Bee Line, Inc., 1 N.Y.2d 169, 134 NXE.2d 457, 151 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1956); Gale v. City of
New York, 18 A.D.2d 12, 238 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1st Dep't 1963), appeal dismissed, 13 N.Y.2d
892, 193 N.E.2d 501, 243 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1963); Betts v. Queens Farm Dairy Co., 162 Misc.
583, 295 N.Y. Supp. 78 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
23. E.g., O'Brien v. Purpura, 25 Misc. 2d 1009, 205 N.Y.S.2d 3 (Sup. Ct. 1960);
Hornecker v. Weisse, 19 Misc. 2d 917, 189 N.Y.S.2d 671 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
24. E.g., Silvern v. Barbagallo, 195 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (invitee riding In a
taxi); Russo v. State, 166 Misc. 316, 2 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Ct. CI. 1938) (prisoner riding in a
state police vehicle).
25. E.g., Ritter v. Zunft, 9 A.D.2d 155, 193 N.Y.S.2d 55 (3d Dep't 1999) (wrongful
death, icy road and excessive speed) ; Brandt v. Jones, 7 A.D.2d 234, 181 N.Y.S.2d 909 (3d
Dep't 1959) (wrongful death and excessive speed); Kinary v. Taylor, 243 App. Div. 651,
276 N.Y. Supp. 688 (3d Dep't 1935) (wrongful death); cf., e.g., Montgomery v. Humphrey,
284 App. Div. 365, 132 N.Y.S.2d 448 (3d Dep't 1954) (evidence that defendant's car drifted
across the center line of the road).
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the lower courts have generally expanded the reasoning of Lahr and have refused
to permit plaintiffs whether guest passengers or not, to rely upon res ipsa
loquitur.26 The few cases which have deviated from this trend have generally
done so on the additional ingredient theory mentioned above. Usually they have
found such an ingredient in evidence of excessive speed.
27
In the instant case, the Appellate Division reversed on the law, the judg-
ment entered on the verdict by the trial court.28 The court related the facts
showing a skid and held that the evidence failed to establish a prima facie case
of negligence since there was no evidence that the skid was caused either by a
defective condition in defendant's truck or by negligence in its operation.
29
The Court of Appeals, while not referring to a skid in its statement of the
facts, distinguished the instant case from the two upon which the Appellate Divi-
sion relied.80 These two cases involved skidding vehicles with facts similar to the
instant case. The first, LoPiccolo v. Knight of Rest Prod. Corp.,31 was an
affirmance of a "defendant's jury verdict and thus the legal problem [applicabil-
ity of res ipsa loquitur] was not deemed open in this court."'3 2 The second case,
Gooch v. Shapiro,3 3 may have pivoted upon the defendant's explanation which
was "not forthcoming in this case."3 4 After noting that these cases stemmed
from Galbraith and Lahr, which were passenger actions, the Court concluded
that, under the facts of the instant case, "showing this and nothing more, a case
of negligence is made out prima facie . . . ,,a3 The Court then went beyond
the facts and stated, "The same rule, open to additional factual evaluation
of his own responsibility for events, would apply to a passenger in a car which
goes out of control."'3 6 The Court reasoned that the delicate balancing process
26. E.g., Gooch v. Shapiro, 7 A.D.2d 307, 182 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1st Dep't 1959), aff'd,
8 N.Y.2d 1088, 170 N.E.2d 830, 208 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1960) ; Hollenbeck v. Hollenbeck, 286 App.
Div. 937, 142 N.YS.2d 911, reargument denied, 286 App. Div. 977, 144 N.Y.S.2d 722 (3d
Dep't 1955); Hammond v. Hammond, 227 App. Div. 336, 237 N.Y. Supp. 557 (3d Dep't
1929) ; cf., eg., Kronick v. Laxere, 11 A.D.2d 739, 204 N.Y.S.2d 616 (2d Dep't 1960) ; Verner
v. Musler, 10 A.D.2d 584, 196 N.Y.S.2d 51 (2d Dep't 1960); Gabrielly v. Mailley, 19 Misc.
2d 560, 196 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Povol v. Storch, 19 Misc. 2d 559, 196 N.Y.S.2d
309 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
27. E.g., Evans v. SJ. Groves & Son Co., 315 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1963); Reich v. Evans,
7 A.D.2d 765, 180 N.Y.S.2d 159 (3d Dep't 1958); Sweet v. Farmers Syndicate, Inc., 279
App. Div. 1118, 112 N.Y.S.2d 580 (3d Dep't 1952); Newman v. Metropolitan Tobacco Co.,
20 Misc. 2d 1013, 189 N.YS.2d 600 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (alternative holding).
28. Pfaffenbach v. White Plains Express Corp., 22 AID.2d 795, 253 N.Y.S.2d 891 (2d
Dep't 1964).
29. Id. at 796, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
30. Instant case at 135, 216 N.E.2d at 324, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
31. 7 A.D.2d 369, 183 N.Y.S.2d 301 (1st Dep't 1959), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 662, 173 N.E.2d
51, 212 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1961) (Defendant's truck skidded across a slippery bridge into plaintiff's
truck which was proceeding in the opposite direction.).
32. Instant case at 135, 216 N.E.2d at 324, 269 N.YS.2d at 116.
33. 7 A.D.2d 307, 182 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1st Dep't 1959), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 1088, 170 N.E.2d
830, 208 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1960) (Defendant-driver, whose vehicle skidded across into an oncom-
ing vehicle, testified to his exercise of due care both prior to and during the skid of his
vehicle.).




of Galbraith has no "practical application to the real world of motor vehicle
operation," 37 and that the rigid categories of negligence and non-negligence
lacked the precision once assumed.38 Consequently, the Court felt that the ques-
tion of "a skid or explanation for a skid, or a car on the wrong side of the road,
or the explanation of why it is there"39 should be left to the "factual judgment
of the jury."40 In a concurring opinion, Judge Burke agreed with the major-
ity of the Court except where the plaintiff is a guest passenger. In addition to
restating the reasoning of Galbraith and Lahr as to guest passengers, he argued
that the evidence needed to establish negligence is more readily available to a
guest passenger than to a stranger.41
While res ipsa loquitur is not mentioned in the instant case, it is readily
discernible from the facts that this doctrine is the object of the Court's thrust.
The absence of the term from the Court's opinion may be taken as an indication
that the Court feels the use of the term adds nothing but a false aura of mysticism
which tends to confuse both judge and jury alike. If this is an accurate deduc-
tion, the step should be heralded in view of the fact that the doctrine in New
York means only a prima facie case based on circumstantial evidence. 42 The
instant case, restricted to the facts enunciated in the majority opinion, simply
settles the rule previously followed by the lower courts. 43 However, the Court's
dicta regarding future treatment of related factual situations is both persuasive
and striking. In addition, the lone concurring opinion suggests an innovation in
the so called skidding cases. The majority opinion is striking in two respects.
First, it departs from the Galbraitk doctrine and places New York on a par
with most other jurisdictions in permitting guest passengers to rely upon res
ipsa loquitur in the swerving vehicle cases. Second, and even more unexpected,
it departs from Lahr and the weight of authority44 and allows all plaintiffs to
rely upon the doctrine in the skidding class of cases. Not only is this indicated
by the words of the Court,45 but it is also fortified by the absence of the word
"skid" from the majority's version of the facts while it is included in the con-
curring opinion's 46 and the Appellate Division's 47 recitals of the facts. It
would thus seem that the Court earnestly intended to obviate all distinctions
between swerving and skidding cases.
The Galbraith Court was correct in visualizing that the guest passenger
cases produced a situation where there were two possible causes for a vehicle
37. Id. at 135-36, 216 N.E.2d at 325, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
38. Id. at 136, 216 N.E.2d at 325, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Id. at 136-37, 216 N.E.2d at 235-36, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
42. See authorities cited in supra note 6.
43. See cases cited in supra note 22.
44. See Annot., 58 AL.R. 264 (1929), supplemented in 113 AL.R. 1002 (1938).
45. Instant case at 136, 216 N.E.2d at 325, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
46. Ibid.
47. Pfaffenbach v. White Plains Express Corp., 22 AJD.2d 795, 253 N.Y.S.2d 891 (2d
Dep't 1964).
RECENT CASES
to swerve off the road, one involving negligence and the other not. However,
they seem to have erred in concluding that the probability that the accident was
caused by the non-negligent factor is equal to the probability that the accident
was caused by negligence. 48 Despite the current furor over safety engineering
and design of automobiles, 49 traffic safety surveys strongly indicate that mechan-
ical defects are a substantial causative factor in only a relatively small percentage
of automobile accidents. 50 It would seem, therefore, that one might confidently
state that accidents which result from the sudden unexplained swerve of a
vehicle do not ordinarily occur without some negligence on the part of the
driver of the automobile. While there are cases of other jurisdictions which
seemingly follow Galbraith, analysis discloses that the refusal to permit reliance
upon res ipsa loquitur pivoted upon other grounds. Most of these cases will fit
into one of the following categories: first, a guest statute required proof of gross
negligence which the doctrine can not infer; 51 second, plaintiff was seeking
summary judgment or a directed verdict in a jurisdiction where the doctrine
merely raises an inference of negligence; 52 third, defendant offered evidence
rebutting the inference or presumption and thus destroyed the procedural effect
of the doctrine;5 3 fourth, plaintiff pleaded or offered proof of specific acts of
negligence in a jurisdiction which, due to such specificity, precludes reliance on
the doctrine;5 4 fifth, the agency producing the injury was not under the exclu-
sive control and management of the defendant. 55
While the equal possibility of a non-negligent versus a negligent cause
argument gains added strength where the skidding of a vehicle is involved, its
validity is not thereby established. Rather, the oft quoted maxim that negligence
cannot be inferred from the mere fact that a vehicle skidded seems to have been
more glibly parroted than thoroughly scrutinized. It must first be noted that
there seems to be a paucity of statistical research on the subject. An elucidating
48. Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230 at 235, 196 N.E. 36 at 39 (1935).
49. See generally Nader, Unsafe at Any Speed-The Designed Built-In Dangers of the
American Automobile (1965). The recent controversy has primarily been concerned with
minimizing the extent of injuries during a crash.
50. See Norman, Road Traffic Accidents-Epidemiology, Control and Prevention 49
(1962) (Police reports in the United Kingdom indicate that mechanical defects are a causa-
tive factor in 2.5% of the accidents investigated.); see also James & Dickenson, Accident
Proneness and Accident Law, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 769, at 770 (1950); President's Committee for
Traffic Safety: Research Report-A Section of the Action Program for Highway Safety 11-12(1963).
51. E.g., Carter v. Driver, 316 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1958); Lombardo v. DeShance, 167
Ohio St. 431, 5 Ohio Ops. 2d 114, 149 N.E.2d 914 (1958).
52. E.g., Thompson v. Kost, 298 Ky. 32, 181 S.W.2d 445 (1944) (reversing directed
verdict for plaintiff); Lively v. Atchley, 36 Tenn. App. 399, 256 S.W.2d 58 (1952) (affirming
denial of plaintiff's motion for a new trial).
53. E.g., Jones v. Nugent, 164 Va. 378, 180 S.E. 161 (1935) (evidence of defective
road due to an excessive drop from the road to the shoulder of the road) ; Kilen v. Beeton,
169 Wis. 385, 172 N.W. 736, (1919) (evidence that after the accident the front tire was
found to be blown out).
54. E.g., Klingman v. Loew's, Inc., 209 Minn. 449, 296 N.W. 528 (1941) (excessive
speed on a curve) ; Hartpence v. Grouleff, 15 N.J. 545, 105 A.2d 514 (1954) (excessive speed).
55. E.g., Smith v. Tatum, 199 Va. 85, 97 SSE.2d 820 (1957) (Passenger-plaintiff, who
was a driving instructor, also considered to be in control of the vehicle.).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
analysis of this problem was made by Judge Friendly in Evans v. S. J. Groves
and Son Co.5 6 When an accident involves a skidding vehicle, there is an imme-
diate reaction suggesting that the skid alone was the cause of the accident. How-
ever, this does not answer the ultimate question of what caused the skid. It is
certainly true that such skids usually occur on slippery roads. But, the propensity
of these roads to be slippery is, generally, readily apparent to the driver due
to conditions of snow, slush and/or ice. These patently hazardous conditions
beckon the reasonably prudent driver to exercise a greater degree of caution in
order to satisfy the standard of due care exacted by tort law.50 It would seem
to be only reasonable then, that "proof of a skid on a highway known to be
dangerous takes a plaintiff far enough down the probability road to call on the
defendants for an explanation and, in the absence of a satisfactory one, to go
to the jury. '157
Additional support for both of these arguments may be found in the
philosophy embraced by the Court in the instant case."8 The Court is accelerat-
ing the swing of the pendulum toward enlarging the spectrum of jury discretion
in determining the issue of negligence.5 9 It is an appraisal by the Court that the
jury is better able to make an equitable determination of the presence or absence
of negligence on an ad hoc basis than a Court is able to do by mechanically
applying rigid categorical rules which themselves may have had their basis in
the same speculation, conjecture and surmise so abhorred in Galbraith and Lahr.
DAVID C. HORAN
FAMILY LAW-APPLICATION OF THE RULES AGAINST SEARCH AND
SEIZURE TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS
The petition charging Williams, a fifteen year-old boy, with being a juvenile
delinquent, alleged that he broke into a resort cottage and stole some jewelry.
Two hours after this theft, a security guard saw Williams acting in a suspicious
manner elsewhere in the same resort. Although the guard did not see Williams
commit or attempt to commit a crime,1 he apprehended the youth and turned
him over to the New York State Police. After being questioned in an approved
facility,2 Williams admitted the theft and took the police to his bungalow; there
he returned the stolen jewelry. At 5:00 a.m., after reducing his confession to
a written statement, he was released into the custody of his sister. During the
entire period the police had Williams in custody, they failed to make any
56. 315 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1963).
57. See N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180(a), (c).
58. Evans v. S.J. Groves & Son, Co., 315 F.2d 335, 343 (2d Cir. 1963).
59. Instant case at 136, 216 N.E. at 325, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
1. See N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 722; N.Y. Code Crhm. Proc. § 183.
2. As required by N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 724(b) (ii) (here the Ellenville sub-station
of the New York State Police).
